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FIXING UP THE OLD JALOPY - THE
MODERN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
UNDER THE ULPA
ROBERT KRATOVIL* AND RAYMOND J. WERNER*"
A vast body of literature has been generated extolling the
virtues of the limited partnership as a vehicle for syndication of
real estate ventures. These articles have dealt primarily with the tax
implications, especially the tax shelter benefits, accompanying the
holding of title to land in this manner.' Additionally, writers often
focus on the federal and state securities law implications of "public"
syndications.2 This emphasis, however, ignores other aspects of this
vehicle which are also of great importance.
The old-fashioned, small-scale limited partnership is "as dead
as the dodo." Today, it has been replaced by the limited partner-
ship involving one large investor and by the "public limited
partnership" wherein interests are offered to relatively large
groups of investors in order to attract substantial amounts of in-
vestment capital. This evolution has greatly enhanced the need for
complete reexploration of the organization and operation of the
limited partnership. It is the purpose of this Article to draw atten-
tion to these neglected aspects of this investment vehicle.
ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS
The Articles of Limited Partnership and the Certificate of Limited
Partnership
Providing a counterpart to the charter and bylaws encountered
in corporate practice, articles of partnership are, in the case of both
* Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School; J.D., De Paul University, 1934. Until
December 30, 1974, Professor Kratovil served as vice president of Chicago Title Insurance
Co.
** Assistant Counsel, Chicago Title Insurance Co.; B. S., De Paul University, 1967;
J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1971.
1 See, e.g., Hall, Use of Limited Partnership to Invest in Depreciable Realty, 21 MERCER L. REV.
481 (1970); Heyman & Parnall, Use (or Abuse o) the Limited Partnership in Financing Real Estate
Ventures in New Mexico, 3 N.M.L. REV. 251 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Heyman & Parnall];
Kanter, Real Estate Tax Shelters, 51 TAxEs 770 (1973); McGuire, Limited Partnerships: Steps that
Can Be Taken to Overcome Problems in the Area, 34 J. TAx. 235 (1971); Perry, Limited Partner-
ships and Tax Shelters: The Crane Rule Goes Public, 27 TAX L. REV. 525 (1972); Roulac,
Resolution of Limited Partnership Disputes: Practical and Procedural Problems, 10 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TR. J. 276, 283-87 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Roulac]; Note, The Limited Partnership
as a Vehicle for Syndicated Real Estate Investment. Selected Tax Considerations, 1973 Wis. L. REv.
1124.
2 See, e.g., Greenwood, Syndication of Undeveloped Real Estate and Securities Law Implications,
9 HousrON L. REV. 53 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Greenwood]; Heyman & Parnall, supra
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general and limited partnerships, frequently employed. Grants of
agency powers and limitations on these powers, for example, are
routinely set forth in this document. Since the articles of partner-
ship in a syndication situation tend to be quite complex, various
aspects will be touched on herein.
With respect to organization, the articles must provide for at
least two persons, a general partner and a limited partner. Initially,
some attorneys will create a limited partnership with one corporate
general partner and one nominal limited partner, making provi-
sions for the admission of additional limited partners and for the
withdrawal of the original limited partner as investors come into
the picture.3 This enables the partnership to embark upon its
existence as well as provide assurance to future investors that they
are buying into a going concern.
In contrast to the articles of limited partnership, the certificate
of limited partnership is statutorily required. To form a limited
partnership, two or more persons must sign and swear to a cer-
tificate setting forth the information required by the Uniform Lim-
ited Partnership Act (ULPA), 4 the filing of which should take place
within a reasonable time after execution of the articles. 5 State
requirements as to place of filing vary,6 however, and a few states
even require publication of the certificate. 7 A common practice in
the area of real estate syndications is to name, in the subscription
form or in the limited partnership agreement, one of the general
note 1, at 262 et seq.; Roulac, supra note 1, at 280, 288 et seq.; Note, Proposed Regulation of
Limited Partnership Investment Programs, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465 (1973).
3 For a thorough discussion of the organization of real estate syndications, see
Lehman, Equity Finance, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, REAL ESTATE FINANCING 45 (1973)
(Real Estate Transcript Series) and Lowell, Selected Problems in the Creation, Operation, and
Dissolution of the Limited Partnership, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, REAL ESTATE SYNDI-
CATIONS 33, 42 (1972) (Real Estate Transcript Series) [hereinafter cited as Lowell]. See also
note 23 infra.
4 The ULPA lists 14 items of information which must be included in a certificate of
limited partnership. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT [hereinafter cited as ULPA]
§ 2(1)(a). The required information consists of items ranging from the name of the partner-
ship and the character of its business to the sharing of profits and the right, if any, to accept
additional limited partners. See also Heyman & Parnall, supra note 1, at 252.
- Stowe v. Merrilees, 6 Cal. App. 2d 217, 44 P.2d 368 (1935) (certificate must be filed
within a reasonable time and, if it does not work to the detriment of the party objecting to it,
49 days does not exceed that limit).
6 A. BROMBERG, CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 145-46 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
CRANE & BROMBERG]. ULPA § 2(1)(b) explicitly leaves designation of the "proper office" for
filing to the individual states.
' CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 146. In New York, for example, "[a] copy of the
[certificate of limited partnership] or a notice containing the substance thereof, [must] be
published once in each week for six successive weeks, in two newspapers of the county in
which such original certificate is filed .... N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 91(b) (McKinney 1948).
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partners as attorney-in-fact of the limited partners, giving him the
power to execute and swear to the certificate on their behalf."
The provision requiring that the certificate be sworn to clearly
mandates that an affidavit, as opposed to an acknowledgment,
accompany the filing. 9 Legally, there is a difference. An acknowl-
edgment merely states, prima facie, that a certain situation exists,
while an affidavit guarantees the veracity of a representation.' 0 A
problem arises because many practicing lawyers are unaware of this
difference. In recognition thereof, some states have deviated from
the ULPA by providing for an acknowledgment instead of requir-
ing an affidavit," a requirement which was ill-advised from the
start. Nevertheless, in those states adhering to the uniform provi-
sion, the use of an acknowledgment instead of an affidavit would
probably not be fatal to the limited partnership aspect of the
venture since only substantial, good faith compliance with the Act
is required.' 2
Unlike the general partnership, where there is no requirement
that any certificate be filed, the limited partnership poses a prob-
lem of dovetailing the statutorily required certificate with the
nonstatutory articles of partnership. With respect to the contents of
the certificate of partnership, the ULPA lists 14 necessary items.' 3
Of course, many more optional items may be included, though
some may find a more comfortable setting in the articles of
partnership, the provisions of which, limited only by the ingenuity
of counsel,' 4 do not become a matter of public record. Indeed,
s It may be argued, however, that an attorney-in-fact cannot be empowered to swear on
behalf of another person. Heyman & Parnall, supra note 1, at 252.
ULPA § 2(1)(a) requires that "[tiwo or more persons desiring to form a limited
partnership . . . [slign and swear to a certificate .... (emphasis added). A signing-and-
swearing requirement also applies to amendments to the certificate. Id. § 25(1)(b).
,0 Courts tend to strictly construe statutes calling for affidavits. See, e.g., Aetna Glass
Corp. v. Mercury Builders, Inc., 145 Ind. App. 286, 250 N.E.2d 598 (1969) (mere acknowl-
edgment on notice of intention to hold mechanic's lien does not fulfill statutory requirement
of verified notice); D.J. Fair Lumber Co. v. Karlin, 199 Kan. 366, 430 P.2d 222 (1967)
(acknowledgment of mechanic's lien does not comply with express statutory requirement of
verification). Courts construe less strictly the requirements of acknowledgment. See, e.g.,
Hackworth v. Flinchum, 475 S.W.2d 140 (Ky. 1971) (subscription of signature to document
in presence of proper official substantially complies with statutory requirement of acknowl-
edgment); cf. Hatcher v. Hall, 292 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956) (substantial compliance
with statute sufficient).
"1 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 15502 (West Supp. 1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 425-22
(1968); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 91 (McKinney 1948); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 48-6-2
(1967).
12 ULPA § 2(2) provides that "substantial compliance in good faith" will fulfill the
statutory requirements of § 2(1).
13 Id. § 2(1)(a). See also note 4 supra.
14 See S. FRESHMAN, PRINCIPLES OF REAL ESTATE SYNDICATION 234-37 (2d ed. 1973) (list
of 50 items which may be included in the partnership agreement); note 53 infra. See also
Roulac, supra note 1, at 279.
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many of the housekeeping arrangements convenient for the lim-
ited partnership may be kept confidential,15 although it should be
noted that some provisions, such as limitations on the powers of
general partners, should be matters of public record in order to
protect the limited partners.' 6
Amending the Certificate
The certificate of limited partnership must be amended in
order to, among other things, change the partnership name, in-
crease or alter the character of the contribution of a limited part-
ner, or provide for the continuation of the business after the
retirement or death of the general partner.1 7 These amendments,
which must be filed in the same manner as the original certificate,'18
are required to be executed by all the partners,1 9 and any amended
certificate must be filed in the proper place. 20
Another event occasioning an amendment of the certificate is
the substitution of a limited partner. If the articles and recorded
certificate give the general partner specific authority to sign an
amended certificate on behalf of the nonassigning limited partners,
the delegation would probably be valid, at least as to third parties.
A problem arises in that such a clause could be construed as a
delegation of authority to an agent, and hence, death of a limited
partner might revoke the power unless it is a power coupled with
an interest. Arguably, it is such a power. In any event, boilerplate
language protecting third parties is effective for that purpose. 1
California's version of section 25 of the ULPA2 2 specifically pro-
vides for signing by the general partner, and clearly a similar
amendment to the ULPA is needed. 23
I5 Lowell, supra- note 3, at 38-39.
16 There is no doubt that restrictions contained in the articles of partnership are binding
as between the parties and will serve as the basis of a breach of trust action by the limited
partners for any unauthorized actions taken by the general partner. Such a remedy, how-
ever, will often be illusory since the general partner is typically one with limited financial
reserves. Furthermore, in the absence of restrictions in the certificate, the limited partners
may find that they are unable to undo the wrong in an action against a third party on the
ground that the action was unauthorized. This result follows because, unlike corporate law,
where officers have little, if any, apparent authority, a general partner is clothed with
sweeping apparent authority. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT [hereinafter UPA] §§ 9, 14. See
also notes 53-59 and accompanying text infra.
17 ULPA § 24(2).
"
6 See id. § 25.
19 d. § 25(l)(b).
2 Id. § 25(5), which provides that the amendment becomes effective when filed in the
office where the certificate is filed.
21 See notes 58-59 and accompanying text infra.
22 CAL. CORP. CODE § 15525.5 (West Supp. 1975).
23 In one instance, the problem was avoided by having one limited partner who, in turn,
sold participations in his interest to prospective investors. Since the units of participation are
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Applicability of the Uniform Partnership Act
An indispensable starting point in the study of the ULPA is an
understanding of its relationship to the Uniform Partnership Act
(UPA). Since it is clear that the UPA is applicable to limited as well
as general partnerships, 24 the underlying philosophy of the UPA
also pertains to limited partnerships. Dean James Barr Ames, the
principal, initial draftsman of the ULPA, strongly favored the
entity theory.25 After Dean Ames' unfortunate death, however,
Dean William Draper Lewis, an advocate of the aggregate theory,26
took over. The result was that the UPA was born with a schizoid
personality, partly embracing the entity theory and partly the
aggregate theory. 27
The Partnership Name and Execution of Documents
The ULPA and state law generally do not require the name of
a limited partnership to include the word "limited" or "limited
partnership." Nevertheless, as a precaution against creating per-
sonal liability on the part of limited partners, it is advisable to
advertise prominently the nature of the entity, having all docu-
ments refer thereto as a "limited partnership." Furthermore, the
partnership name may not contain the name of any limited part-
ner.
28
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned confusion as to whether
a partnership should be treated as an aggregate or an entity, it is
quite clear that in any jurisdiction that has adopted the UPA and
the ULPA, both a general partnership and a limited partnership
can own and convey land in the firm name. 29 When title is taken in
not partnership interests, there is no occasion for substituting a limited partner. Obviously,
this is an awkward and untested arrangement. See Augustine & Hrusoff, The Public Real
Estate Limited Partnership, 27 Bus. LAw. 615, 617, 620-21 (1972).
24 UPA § 6; see Horn v. Builders Supply Co., 401 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); 2
R. RowLEY & D. Siv, PARTNERSHIP § 53.29 (2d ed. 1960).2 5 The entity theory regards the partnership as a legal personality separate and distinct
from the individual legal personalities of its members. See Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, Real
Estate Equity Investments and the Institutional Lender: Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained, 39
FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 608 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Roegge, Talbot & Zinman].26 Id. at 609. The aggregate theory closely follows the common law notion that the
individual partners deal directly with each other and third parties in transacting partnership
business.27 Id. at 608-10. While this same hybrid approach is reflected in the Internal Revenue
Code, both the Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act treat a
partnership as an entity. Id. at 610.21 ULPA § 5. Use of a limited partner's name in contravention of § 5 can, under certain
circumstances, expose the limited partner to the liability of a general partner. See id. § 5(2).
Notably, in manyjurisdictions, statutes requiring registration of trade names are applica-
ble to partnerships. See CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 106. This requirement often
dovetails with the recording requirements of ULPA § 2(1)(b).
"' CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 221-24.
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the firm name, the partnership must also convey or mortgage in
that name.30 Thus, in any deed or mortgage conveying partnership
land, the partnership name will appear as grantor or mortgagor. In
addition, the partnership name will appear on the signature line,
followed, as in the execution of corporate documents, by the signa-
tures of those authorized to sign in a representative capacity. Nor-
mally, a general partner will sign on the "by" line, placing beneath
it the statement that he is doing so "as duly authorized agent of
said partnership pursuant to powers conferred by Articles of
Partnership dated " Such partner's name will also
appear in the certificate of acknowledgment which will state that
the execution of the instrument was the free and voluntary act of
that partner and of the partnership. In this way, the certificate will
be conformed to the law of the state where the land lies. Most
lawyers seem to prefer the long form of acknowledgment even
where the state has adopted the Uniform Acknowledgments Act.
THE CORPORATE PARTNER
The Corporate General Partner
Many public limited partnerships have one general partner, a
corporation. When these vehicles were first launched, considerable
controversy emerged concerning the power of a corporation to
become a general partner. Commentators argued that a basic rule
of corporation law mandates that the destiny of the corporation
and all its major decisions be the end product of the informed
judgment of a responsible board of directors. 3' But when a corpo-
ration enters into a partnership, the partners make the decisions
and the control of the board of directors over the corporation is to
that extent watered down.32 The UPA does not solve the problem.
Although it does provide that two or more "persons" can form a
partnership 33 and defines "persons" to include corporations, 34 the
UPA does not include express statutory authority rejecting the
former majority position that a corporation is without power to
30 UPA § 8(3).
31 H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTER-
PRISES 351 (2d ed. 1970).
32 Lowell, Organizing a Limited Partnership to Achieve Real Estate Investment Objectives in
Indiana, 48 IND. L.J. 369, 393 (1973); Comment, The Limited Partnership with a Corporate
General Partner-Federal Taxation -Partnership or Association?, 24 Sw. L.J. 285, 288 (1970).
33 UPA § 6. Note that the UPA and the ULPA are complementary in that the provisions
of the UPA are used to fill in the blanks of the ULPA. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
34 UPA § 2.
[Vol. 50:51
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enter into a partnership. 35 Fortunately, many states have adopted
provisions in line with the Model Business Corporation Act specif-
ically authorizing corporations to deal in the interests of partner-
ships3 6 or "to be a partner. ' 37 Further, the Model Business Corpo-
ration Act severely restricts the old doctrine of ultra vires.35 And,
since limited partners must refrain from interfering with the oper-
ation of the business on pain of losing their limited liability, the
problem seems to disappear where the corporation is the only
general partner.39
The Corporate Limited Partner
The problem of delegation of power again arises when a cor-
poration acquires a limited partnership interest. Since management
power is delegated only to the extent of the assets invested, how-
ever, case law sanctions this investment.4"
POWERS OF THE LIMITED PARTNER
Occasionally, a question is raised concerning the effect of pro-
visions of the ULPA giving limited partners a vote on matters of
major importance, such as the dissolution of the partnership or the
sale of all of its assets.41 Whether the limited partners become
personally liable because of their right to assume control in such
circumstances is unresolved. It has been suggested, however, that
" This majority rule that a corporation lacked the power to become a partner applied
unless a statute or the corporate charter expressly authorized the corporation to enter into a
partnership. See, e.g., Fechteler v. Palm Bros., 133 F. 462 (6th Cir. 1904); People v. North
River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890); Boyd v. American Carbon-Black
Co., 182 Pa. 206, 37 A. 937 (1897).
3 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 4g (1971).
.7Id. § 4p. For example, in New York, a corporation has among its general powers the
power "to be a promoter, partner, member, associate or manager of other business enter-
prises or ventures . N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 202(a)(15) (McKinney 1963) (emphasis
added).
"3 See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.
39 CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 54; see ULPA § 7. In situations of extreme
urgency, however, as in the case of a failing enterprise, the general partner corporation's
board of directors loses its unfettered discretion since §§ 9, 10 of the ULPA,see note 62 infra,
specifically give the limited partners a voice on certain matters.
"'See Port Arthur Trust Co. v. Muldrow, 155 Tex. 612, 291 S.W.2d 312 (1956). In Port
Arthur, the Supreme Court of Texas held that a trust company, which was organized as a
corporation, could qualify as a "person" in order to enter into a limited partnership. Having
found this to be an exception to the rule that a corporation cannot become a partner, the
court noted that only specified trust assets were to be invested. The assets of the corporation,
therefore, would remain intact and within the control of its officers and directors. Id. at 616,
291 S.W.2d at 314. For a fuller discussion of the Port Arthur case, see 55 MIcH. L. REv. 588
(1957) and 35 TEXAS L. REv. 265 (1956).
41 See ULPA §§ 9, 10. See also Feld, The "Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 HAgv. L.
REv. 1471, 1474-75 (1969).
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the ULPA, in giving a voice to the limited partners on these basic
issues, obviously contemplated that they would not, by doing the
very things it authorizes, lose their status as such.42 Some states
have seen fit to spell this out.43 Moreover, Professor William
Draper Lewis has stated rather categorically that the ULPA con-
templates "some degree of control" over the enterprise by the
limited partners. 44 Evidently, he had in mind situations where the
limited partners would be exercising powers conferred by the
ULPA.
45
Another method thought to provide some form of control to
the limited partners is the appointment of a general agent having
veto power over certain acts of the general partners.4 6 This ap-
proach is untested and involves danger. Of course, the limited
partners are free to "advise" the general partner and still remain
secure in their positions. 47 Notably, however, the general partner
has the last word and may entirely ignore the advice of the inves-
tors.
48
Granting the limited partners power to remove the general
partner is fraught with great difficulty and danger.49 An additional
problem is created by regulatory provisions which, while seeking to
protect the limited partners, may jeopardize their status as such. 50
Whether courts will find that the exercise of these powers granted
to the limited partners constitutes taking part in the control of the
business remains to be seen.5 1
42 Feld, The "Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1481 (1969).
4 3 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 15507(b) (West Supp. 1975), which states that
a limited partner shall not be deemed to take part in the control of the business by
virtue of his possessing or exercising a power, specified in the certificate, to vote
upon matters affecting the basic structure of the partnership.
See also Comment, "Control" in the Limited Partnership, 7 JOHN MARSHALL J. 416, 420-24
(1974).
" Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 715, 723 (1917). See also
ULPA § 1, Comment, in 6 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 562 (master ed. 1969).4 5 See, e.g., ULPA §§ 9, 10.
46 INST. CONTINUING LEG. EDUC., CREATIVE REAL ESTATE FINANCING 142 (H. Eglit ed.
1968).4 7 Taubman, Limited Partnerships, CORPORATE PRACTICE COMMENTATOR, Feb. 1962, at 15,
23.
48id.
49 Roulac, supra note 1, at 295-97. See also Comment, "Control" in the Limited Partnership, 7
JOHN MARSHALLJ. 416, 427 (1974).
Where a change of general partners does take place, insulation of the new general
partner from problems created by his predecessor is a matter of great concern. Roulac, supra
note 1, at 295 et seq.
50 See, e.g., Mosburg, Regulation of Tax Shelter Investments, 25 OKLA. L. REv. 207, 220-21
(1972).
51 See generally Comment, Partnership: Can Rights Required to be Given Limited Partners
Under New Tax Shelter Investment Regulations be Reconciled with Section 7 of the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act?, 26 OKu.A. L. REV. 289 (1973).
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POWERS OF THE GENERAL PARTNER
Power of the Corporate General Partner to Delegate Management
Functions
Partnership is basically an agency situation, and agency law is
applicable. 52 Hence, the question will arise as to the power of the
general partner - an agent of the limited partners - to delegate
his management functions. Since the articles can clearly spell out
the power of the general partner to hire a managing agent, good
draftsmanship and foresight can circumvent any problem that
might arise.
Restricting the Power of General Partners
No doubt can exist as to the power of the limited partners to
include in the articles of partnership restrictions on the power of
the general partner.53 For example, the general partner may, for a
reasonable period of time, be prohibited from establishing certain
competing enterprises.5 4 When limited partnership real estate is in
the construction stage and a danger of unauthorized activity by the
developer general partner with respect to his other ventures exists,
his powers in this area can be circumscribed.5 5 Or, the limited
partners may want to restrict the right of a managing partner to
raise his own salary.
Protecting Persons Dealing with General Partners
The manner in which restrictions on the power of the general
partner are to be communicated to third parties merits serious
consideration. Since the ULPA lists certain items the certificate of
limited partnership must contain, but does not otherwise limit its
contents, 56 restrictive provisions may be included in this recorded
52 Of course, a general partner, like other agents, must possess the requisite degree of
knowledge and exercise skill and care in the performance of his functions. See Roulac, supra
note 1, at 287-91.
53 In Lanier v. Bowdoin, 282 N.Y. 32, 24 N.E.2d 732 (1939), for example, the court
stated that as between themselves, members of a limited partnership may include'in the
articles of partnership any agreement not violative of statutory or common law.
54 Cf. Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d 186 (1956) (restrictive covenant in limited
partnership agreement providing that limited partners would not compete upon dissolution
of the partnership upheld).
5 5 See B. Lehman, Equity Finance, in PRAGTicrNG LAW INSTITUTE, REAL ESTATE FINANC-
ING 45, 102 (1973) (Real Estate Transcript Series).
56 ULPA § 2(1). See generally Feld, The "Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 HARv. L.
REv. 1471, 1482 (1969).
19751
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
document. 57 Of equal importance are the provisions conferring
powers upon the general partners. These provisions should appear
in the articles of partnership and, for the protection of third
persons dealing with the partnership, in the recorded certificate.
In order to further protect third parties dealing with the
general partner, both the articles of partnership and the recorded
certificate of partnership should contain boilerplate language simi-
lar to that found in trust instruments5 8 excusing persons dealing
with the trustee from examining the source of his powers. Al-
though the boilerplate is probably not technically necessary, 59 it
should be included so that third parties are not compelled to
inquire as to whether a particular transaction needs the approval of
the limited partners.
In Spilker v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.,60 the gen-
eral partner sold all of the real estate of the partnership without
obtaining the consent of the limited partners. Rejecting the limited
partners' argument that this was not authorized by the articles, the
court upheld the sale, noting that "nothing in the agreement ex-
pressly prohibited sale of all the partnership property without the
consent of the limited partners. '' 6 a Obviously a boilerplate provi-
sion in the articles of partnership and recorded certificate excusing
the purchaser from examining these instruments could have
further strengthened his claim to protection. Where such a provi-
sion is lacking, a purchaser may have to show compliance with the
ULPA. Since the sale of all assets could put the partnership out of
business, it may be argued that the ULPA requires the written
consent of all of the limited partners.6" The ULPA speaks in terms
'7 See ULPA § 9(i)(a), which states that a general partner has no authority to "[d]o any
act in contravention of the certificate" without the written consent or ratification of all the
limited partners.
58 See, e.g., Eisel v. Miller, 84 F.2d 174, 178 (8th Cir. 1936). An illustrative clause may be
found in Mist Properties, Inc. v. Fitzsimmons Realty Co., 228 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1962), which upheld the validity of a clause which read:
Nothing herein contained shall require any assignee or grantee to investigate the
General Partners' authority to sell and convey all or any portion of the Property or
any other property of the Partnership, or to grant any option therefor, nor require
any such assignee or grantee to inquire as to whether the approval of the Limited
Partners for any such sale or conveyance has first been obtained. Any such con-
veyance, if executed by the General Partners, shall bind the Partnership.
Id. at 410 (emphasis omitted).
'9 See UPA §§ 9(1), 10(3); cf. Turner v. Turner, 131 Vt. 253, 258-59, 305 A.2d 592, 596
(1973) (dictum).
60 Civil No. 29,095 (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 25, 1972).
61 Id. at 8.
62 ULPA § 9(1) (emphasis added) reads:
A general partner shall have all the rights and powers and be subject to all the
restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners,
[Vol. 50:51
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of consent to a "specific act,"63 however, and it is conceivable that
such a general consent in the articles and in the recorded certificate
might not constitute compliance with the Act anyway. 4 Neverthe-
less, a provision protecting a bona fide third party will simply
relieve him of making an inquiry. Reasoning from numerous cases
decided on the basis of trust law, such a provision should protect
the third party. 65 After all, the sale, at worst, is a breach of trust,
and this is precisely what the trust boilerplate protects against
where an innocent third party is involved.
THE TRUSTEE LIMITED PARTNER
Since the purchase of a limited partnership interest results in a
somewhat expansive delegation of his fiduciary duties, a trustee
contemplating such an investment ought to examine his trust in-
strument carefully to see that it authorizes such action. 66 The
Partnership Acts themselves present no obstacles in this regard,
since the definition of "person" is quite broad.6 Notwithstanding
the absence of these possible barriers, the trustee must be mindful
that such an investment might be neither advisable nor permissible
under the "prudent man" rule governing his investments.
except that without the written consent or ratification of the specific act by all the limited
partners, a general partner or all the general partners have no authority to
(a) Do any act in contravention of the certificate,
(b) Do any act which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business of the
partnership,
(c) Confess a judgment against the partnership,
(d) Possess partnership property, or assign their rights in specific partnership
property, for other than a partnership purpose,
(e) Admit a person as a general partner,
(f) Admit a person as a limited partner, unless the right so to do is given in the
certificate,
(g) Continue the business with partnership property on the death, retirement or
insanity of a general partner, unless the right so to do is given in the certificate.
63 Id.
64 This argument is strengthened by the negative implication of the language of ULPA
§ 9 itself. In other words, since the right to do two of the specific acts may be given in the
certificate, it follows that blanket consent for the other specific acts may not be given in the
certificate. Compare id. §§ 9(l)(f)-(g) with id. §§ 9(1)(a)-(e). But see Mist Properties, Inc. v.
Fitzsimmons Realty Co., 228 N.Y.S.2d 406,410 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962), quoting Lanier
v. Bowdoin, 282 N.Y. 32, 38, 24 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1939).
65 See, e.g., Swanson v. Randall, 30 Ill. 2d 194, 195 N.E.2d 656 (1964). In Swanson, the
trustee placed a mortgage on the res of the trust, real property, and converted the money to
his own use. The trust agreement stated that no person dealing with the trustee had an
obligation to see that the terms of the trust were complied with, and hence, the action to set
aside the mortgage was unsuccessful. See also P. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES § 43, at
168-69 (1970); COMM,. ON CONTINUING EDUC. OF THE BAR, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
CALIFORNIA LAND SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT § 13.39, at 338 (1960).
66 See Note, Trust Participation in Partnership Ventures, 3 STAN. L. REV. 467, 468-69 (195 1).
67 " 'Person' includes individuals, partnerships, corporations, and other associations."
UPA § 2.
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THE LIFE COMPANY LIMITED PARTNER
Taking Collateral Security
Unlike the "public" limited partnership, a limited partnership
may involve an arrangement pursuant to which a large financial
institution, often a life insurance company or one of its wholly
owned subsidiaries, is both mortgagee and the only limited partner.
The one critical issue in such cases is whether the general creditors
of the partnership will enjoy priority over the mortgagee if insol-
vency occurs. 68 If this question is answered in the affirmative, large
financial institutions could suffer disastrous loss. Fortunately, it is
clear that the answer is in the negative.
The problem arises because of the awkward wording of section
13 of the ULPA, which provides:
(1) A limited partner also may loan money to and transact other
business with the partnership, and, unless he is also a general
partner, receive on account of resulting claims against the
partnership, with general creditors, a pro rata share of the assets.
No limited partner shall in respect to any such claim
(a) Receive or hold as collateral security any partnership
property, or
(b) Receive from a general partner or the partnership any
payment, conveyance, or release from liability, if at the time the
assets of the partnership are not sufficient to discharge partnership
liabilities to persons not claiming as general or limited partners.
(2) The receiving of collateral security, or a payment, con-
veyance, or release in violation of the provisions of paragraph (1)
is a fraud on the creditors of the partnership. 69
Obviously, it can be argued that subsection (a) categorically pro-
hibits a limited partner from making secured loans to the partner-
ship. Alternatively, it can be argued that a printer's error occurred,
namely, the italicized language was meant to be applicable to both
subsections (a) and (b) and should have been brought out to the
margin.
The mischief sought to be avoided by the printer's error in-
terpretation is the case of the limited partner who accepts security
from an insolvent partnership. 70 This reading is borne out by a
Commissioner's comment stating that the limited partner may loan
money to the partnership
11 For a fuller discussion of the problem, see Saunders, Joint Ventures in Real Estate
Investment Part 2 - The Other Side of the Coin: Some of the Problems, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN LIFE ASSOCIATION 113, 119-20 (1973).
9 ULPA § 13 (emphasis added).
7'See Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, supra note 25, at 604.
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provided he does not, in respect to such transactions, accept
from the partnership collateral security, or receive from any
partner or the partnership any payment, conveyance, or release
from liability, if at the time the assets of the partnership are not
sufficient to discharge its obligations to persons not general or
limited partners.
7 1
The comment to section 23 of the ULPA provides further
support for this theory:
Subsection (a) of this section, which apparently gives to a special
partner the rights of a creditor with respect to claims other than
for his contribution, is a departure from the policy of the earlier
acts, which usually placed the special partner on the same footing
as the general partner in this respect.7 2
In the leading case of Hughes v. Dash,7 3 moreover, the court in
effect adopted the printer's error theory, and subsection (a) was
not read as a categorical prohibition. This construction is in keep-
ing with the elementary rule that to give effect to the spirit and
intent of the legislature, words and phrases may be transposed. 4
The legislative intent in this instance, being entirely free from
doubt, the printer's error theory was accepted in A.T.E. Financial
Services Inc. v. Corson,7 5 and a number of jurisdictions have mod-
ified the language of the ULPA accordingly. 76
It has been argued that at least in New York, however, a
question persists:
In a letter on the stationery of the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, New York State Board, dated March 21, 1922 and
found in the Governor's Jacket on the ULPA, Carlos C. Alden, a
New York Commissioner, wrote to the Honorable C. Tracey
Stagg, counsel to the Governor, urging approval by the Governor
of the ULPA. The letter commented "only on the most impor-
tant changes which it [the ULPAJ will make in our existing law."
7 ULPA § 1, Comment, in 6 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 565 (master ed. 1969).
72 ULPA § 23, Comment, in 8 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 32 (1922).
73 309 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1962), noted in CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 550.
"' See, e.g., In re Barry Equity Corp., 276 App. Div. 685, 689, 96 N.Y.S.2d 808, 812 (1st
Dep't 1950) (literal meaning of statute rejected in favor of effectuating legislative intent). In
Acheson v. Fujiko Furusho, 212 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1954), the court stated:
"It is the duty of this Court to give effect to the intent of Congress. Primarily this
intent is ascertained by giving the words their natural significance, but if this leads
to an unreasonable result plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a
whole, we must examine the matter further. We may then look to the reason of the
enactment and inquire into its antecedent history and give it effect in accordance
with its design and purpose, sacrificing, if necessary, the literal meaning in order
that the purpose may not fail."
Id. at 295 (emphasis omitted), quoting Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922).
75 111 N.J. Super. 254, 268 A.2d 73 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1970).
7"See Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, supra note 25, at 606; e.g., 'CAL. CORP. CODE § 15513
(West Supp. 1975).
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Section 13 was one of the three sections discussed in the letter.
Mr. Alden's comment was as follows: "Under § 13, a limited
partner may not secure a preference on partnership assets, upon
a loan of money to it, through the taking of collateral security.
This is not prevented under our present statute, and seems a
proper safeguard to add to our law." Most of the foregoing was
also embodied in a memorandum from Mr. Stagg apparently to
the Governor, also found in the Governor's Jacket, in which he
stated the bill "merits approval." In addition, the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, in approving the bill, used the
exact language quoted above from Mr. Alden's letter. Thus there
is some indication that the New York drafters of 1922 intended a
result somewhat different from that intended by the drafters of
the original uniform act, which had been approved by the Gen-
eral Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1916.
7 7
The difficulty with this view is that it ignores the fact that the
ULPA is a uniform act. Undoubtedly, in construing a uniform act,
great deference should be accorded the intention of the drafters in
order that the desired uniformity be achieved.7 8 The ULPA,
moreover, plainly commands this rule of construction. 79 The so-
called New York view also ignores the rule that official comments
are to be given great weight in interpreting uniform acts.80
Likewise, the rule of statutory construction that absurd and incon-
venient consequences must be avoided8 1 is not honored. It is per-
fectly obvious that in times of stringency or panic the only funds a
limited partnership can look to are in the hands of its friends.8 2
7 7 d. at 605-06 (footnotes omitted).
78 See People's Sav. & Trust Co. v. Munsert, 212 Wis. 449, 249 N.W. 527 (1933), wherein
the court stated:
In construing a uniform law, the meaning of which is not clear, the intention of
those who drafted it, if that intention may be ascertained, should be given control-
ling consideration, else the desired uniformity will not result. Futile indeed is the
passage of uniform laws by the several states if the courts are to construe them
differently.
Id. at 457, 249 N.W. at 531.
79 ULPA § 28(2) states that "[tlhis act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effect
its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it."
8 0 See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.11 (4th ed. C.
Sands 1973).
81 See H. Kauffman & Sons Saddlery Co. v. Miller, 298 N.Y. 38, 44, 80 N.E.2d 322, 325
(1948) ("Where the language of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, the courts will
adopt that which avoids injustice, hardship, constitutional doubts or other objectionable
results.").82 See Clapp v. Lacey, 35 Conn. 463 (1868), wherein the court held that a limited partner
who had made a loan to the partnership over his capital investment did not have to wait until
all other partnership creditors were satisfied to recover his loan. In Lacey, the court found
that the statutory section depriving partners of creditor status should be limited to capital
advances and not extended to all other advances made in good faith and in the best interests
of the partnership. Id. at 466, 469.
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And those friends just won't be there if the New York rule is
imposed. Creating an obvious overlap between subsections (a) and
(b), this approach also disregards the rule that every part of a
statute must be given effect so that each subdivision is operative, no
conflict exists, and the various sections are harmonious and sensi-
ble.8 3 And finally, it is self-evident that neither the material in a
Governor's Jacket nor the statement of one Commissioner consti-
tutes legitimate legislative history.
It has been stated by an eminent authority that section 13 of
the ULPA expresses a policy consistent with that of section 8 of the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,8 4 an approach completely
consistent with the philosophy expressed in Hughes v. Dash:
Every conveyance of partnership property and every partnership
obligation incurred when the partnership is or will be thereby
rendered insolvent, is fraudulent as to partnership creditors, if
the conveyance is made or obligation is incurred,
(a) To a partner, whether with or without a promise by him
to pay partnership debts, or
(b) To a person not a partner without fair consideration to
the partnership as distinguished from consideration to the indi-
vidual partners.8 5
Section 1 of this same Act defines "conveyance" to include "every
payment of money, assignment, release, transfer, lease, mortgage
or pledge of tangible or intangible property, and also the creation
of any lien or encumbrance. '8 6 Since the taking of security by a
partner under this uniform act is declared to be fraudulent "when
the partnership is or will be thereby rendered insolvent," it follows
that the taking of the same security interest during good times
would be permissible.
Finally, the language of both the UPA and the ULPA clearly
embraces the philosophy of Hughes v. Dash. Since the UPA defines
"conveyance" to include "every assignment, lease, mortgage, or
encumbrance," '87 this definition being applicable to limited partner-
ships, 8 the word "conveyance" in section 13(b) of the ULPA in-
cludes a mortgage. And if the phrase "collateral security" in section
See Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404, 409 (1945), wherein the Supreme Court stated
that "(r]esort to the policy of a law may be had to ameliorate its seeming harshness or to
qualify its apparent absolutes," especially where "a strict reading of a law results in the
emasculation or deletion of a provision which a less literal reading would preserve."
"'See 2 R. RoWLEY & D. SIVE, PARTNERSHIPS § 53.13 (2d ed. 1960).
8 UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 8.
86Id. § 1.8 7 UPA § 2.
881d. § 6(2).
1975]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
13(a) also includes a mortgage, the two sections conflict. This is an
inadmissible construction.
Operating a Noninsurance Business
Another problem is created for the institutional investor if it
must come to the forefront and exercise control to protect its
investment. If this situation develops, the life company limited
partner ipso facto runs afoul of regulations that prohibit it from
carrying on a noninsurance business.8 9 At least at the outset, there
seems to be no way around this dilemma short of sale of its
position.
THE "FOREIGN" LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
Until 1974 there was virtually no in-depth analysis of the
multistate limited partnership. Yet, the problems raised by this type
of operation are enormous and virtually beyond solution. 90 In the
more sophisticated corporate law, "doing business problems" are
routinely encountered. But the aitiquated simplistic ULPA evinces
no recognition of the problem, undoubtedly because it dealt with
an old-fashioned vehicle with a small number of limited partners
and totally ignored the possibility that a partnership may operate in
many states.
The title insurance companies were the first to become aware
of the implications of multistate operation. Most of them required
a limited partnership formed in state A but acquiring land in state
B to file a partnership certificate in the county where the land
being acquired was located.91 In addition, all requirements of local
law as to limited partnerships had to be complied with. While these
requirements adequately protect the title company, they ignore the
problems involved in the entity theory, such as whether a partner-
ship crossed the state line or whether a new partnership had been
created. Some lawyers take comfort from a statement in the cer-
tificate of partnership filed in state B that "this partnership is the
'9 INST. CONTINUING LEG. EDUC., CREATIVE REAL ESTATE FINANCING 140 (H. Eglit ed.
1968).
" For a discussion of the problems involved in multistate operation of the limited
partnership, see Note, Foreign Limited Partnerships: A Proposed Amendment to the Unform Limited
Partnership Act, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1174 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Limited Partner-
ships]. The author concludes that since treatment of foreign limited partnerships under the
ULPA provides inadequate protection both for limited partners and individuals dealing with
foreign limited partnerships, the ULPA should be amended to provide uniform rules of
recordation for foreign limited partnersiips.
91 For a discussion of filing requirements generally, see CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note
6, at 146, and 52 CORNELL L.Q. 157 (1966).
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same partnership as is evidenced by certificate recorded in ____
county, State of _ in Book Page
The confusion and conflict in this area are beyond imagina-
tion. A few jurisdictions have enacted legislation dealing with the
problem. Florida and Hawaii, for example, require a foreign lim-
ited partnership to file locally a copy of its limited partnership
certificate. 92 In Florida, the partnership name must include either
the word "limited" or its abbreviation, "Ltd. '93 In Hawaii, the filing
of an annual statement is required. 94 In other jurisdictions, state
officials have imposed their own nonstatutory requirements. 95 If a
"foreign" limited partnership tenders its certificate of partnership
to a local recorder of deeds, it may be met by a polite refusal to
accept the document, accompanied by the statement that local
recording laws make no provision for the recording of foreign
limited partnership certificates. 96 The point is of overwhelming
significance because failure to file a certificate in a county where
the partnership does business may constitute a lack of "substantial
compliance" with the ULPA. 97 Reliance on conflicts of law rules is
unwise. 98 Finally, in a few states, formal procedures, like those
relating to foreign corporations, have been enacted.
An additional problem is presented when one of the partners
involved is a corporation. If the partnership's activities extend into
a state where the corporate partner is not licensed to do business,
the corporation may be subject to the doing business laws of that
jurisdiction.99 While the total inquiry into this question is beyond
92 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 620.40 et seq. (Supp. 1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 425-71 et seq.
(Supp. 1974).
; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.05 (1956).
'4 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 425-50 (Supp. 1974). See Foreign Limited Partnerships, supra note
90, at 1183.
95 See Foreign Limited Partnerships, supra note 90, at 1186.
"
6See id. at 1188-89.
'
7 See id at 1188.
98 See CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 146.
"
5See Scott Co. v. Enco Constr. Co., 264 So. 2d 409 (Miss. 1972) (where one of three
foreign corporations involved in a joint venture had not qualified to do business in the state,
each was deemed to have been transacting business within the meaning of the state statute);
Harris v. Columbia Water & Light Co., 108 Tenn. 245, 67 S.W. 811 (1901) (a partnership
composed of two individuali and a foreign, unlicensed corporation cannot enforce a contract
made in and to be performed in the state); Ashland Lumber Co. v. Detroit Salt Co., 114 Wis.
66, 89 N.W. 904 (1902) (in au action against a partnership two of whose partners were
foreign corporations, the court upheld a statute which provided that contracts made by an
unlicensed corporation were void in its behalf, but were enforceable against the corpora-
tion). But cf Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974) (commerce clause pre-
cludes a state court's refusal to enforce a contract made by a foreign corporation because the
corporation was not licensed to do business in the state). See generally 17 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8500 (1960); R. KRATOVIL, MODERN
MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 77 (1972).
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the scope of this Article, 100 it is clear that the mere leasing or
ownership of land ordinarily does not constitute doing business.'
Of course, the governing state's laws may differ, and each transac-
tion must be analyzed in light of its own set of facts.
Although it too is beyond the scope of this Article, choice of
law problems loom large when the limited partnership operates in
many states. Generally, the law of the state in which the partner-
ship was organized and the partnership agreement concluded will
govern the liability of the limited partner. 0 2 But many and diverse
conflicts rules have been applied to the whole of partnership prob-
lems, 10 3 and whether an aggregate or entity approach is taken may
complicate the problem by having a telling impact on the constitu-
tional protections the partnership is afforded.' 0
4
REAL ESTATE SYNDICATES: AREAS OF CONCERN
Closing the Deal
Normally the promoter who has acquired a contract for the
purchase of land includes therein a provision authorizing its as-
signment. After the partnership has been duly organized and
funds are available to pay the balance of the purchase price, the
contract is assigned to the limited partnership and the deed exe-
cuted in the partnership name is delivered thereto. 05 If there is to
be a purchase-money mortgage, it also should be executed in the
partnership name.' 0 6 Obviously provisions must be included in the
purchase money mortgage subordinating it to the construction
'00 See generally CORPORATION TRUST CORP. SYSS., WHAT CONSTITUTES DOING BUSINESS
(1973).
101 See 17 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8486, at
630, § 8487 (1960). But see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 613.01 (Supp. 1975).
10 2 See Comment, Conflict of Laws Under the Uniform Partnership Act and Uniform Limited
Partnership Act, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 310 (1918); 44 HARV. L. REV. 615 (1931). See generally
Comment, Limited Liability of Shareholders in Real Estate Investment Trusts and the Conflicts of
Laws, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 696 (1962).
13 See, e.g., Wallan v. Rankin, 173 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1949) (tort liability of a surviving
partner governed by the law of the place where the tort was committed): Price v. Indepen-
dent Oil Co., 168 Miss. 292, 150 So. 521 (1933) (status of the parties as partners governed by
the laws of the state where the parties reside); First Nat'l Bank v. Hall, 150 Pa. 466, 24 A.
665 (1892) (whether a contract created a partnership governed by the law of the place where
the contract was to be performed).
104 By using an aggregate theory approach, it can be argued that the privileges and
immunities clause prohibits a state from excluding individuals engaged in a lawful business.
See Foreign Limited Partnerships, supra note 90, at 1183 n.42. For many purposes, however,
courts have held that a partnership is an entity, see, e.g., United States v. A&P Trucking Co.,
358 U.S. 121 (1958) (partnership as an entity could be held criminally responsible for
violations of Interstate Commerce Commission regulations committed by its employees),
and, as such, it is unlikely that it would be afforded such protection.
'
05 See UPA § 8(3); Greenwood, supra note 2, at 58-59.
106 Greenwood, supra note 2, at 58.
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loan, end loan, and bridge loan. These provisions must be drafted
with great care. 0 7
Disclosure
The prospective general partner often is a developer corpora-
tion which has a contract to purchase particular land. In addition
to commitments for mortgage financing, soil tests, architectural
drawings, and cost and income projections may have been made.
While the general partner's contribution to the partnership will
consist of its contract to purchase the land and its developmental
expertise, the limited partners will provide the bulk of the equity
capital. 0 8
In order to fully disclose the investment potential of the opera-
tion and the various risks involved therein, the syndicator will
prepare a brochure similar to a securities prospectus. If the trans-
action falls within the purview of federal or state securities laws, the
disclosure provisions of these acts must be complied with. But even
assuming that the syndication is exempt from these regulatory
provisions, prudence, based on Texas Gulf Sulphur'0 9 thinking, dic-
tates the making of detailed disclosures to prospective investors.
Areas warranting carefully drafted disclosure have been thought to
include, inter alia, the risk-factors of the partnership, its organiza-
tional structure and management, the tax implications of the ven-
ture, the terms of the offering, and the relevant competition. 110
Partnership Opportunity
There is no doubt, of course, that the general partner is a
fiduciary of the limited partners."' In addition to the well-known
'
07 See R. KRATOVIL, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 241-55 (1972).
108 Fink,Joint Ventures, Limited Partnerships, Sale-Leaseback and Other Devices: The Develop-
er's Approach -Part I, 52 CHI. B. REc. 323, 326 (1971).
10 9 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1966) (en banc), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969) (anyone who possesses material inside information must either disclose
it to the investing public or abstain from trading in or recommending the securities con-
cerned as long as such information remains undisclosed). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971) (corporate insiders who
purchased stock prior to public disclosure of the corporation's discovery of ore deposit
required to make restitution of profits); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (investors who sold stock because of deceptive
press release regarding corporation's mineral exploitation allowed to recover from corpora-
tion and officer responsible for the release even though there had been no trading in the
market by the corporation's insiders). For a discussion of the Texas Gulf Sulphur cases, see
Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: Expanding Concepts of Corporate Disclosure Under SEC Rule lOb-5,
43 ST. JOHN's L. Rxv. 425, 655 (1969), 82 HARv. L. REv. 938 (1969), and 26 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 267 (1971).
110 Heyman & Parnall, supra note 1, at 276-85.
11 See Roulac, supra note 1, at 287-9 1. The fiduciary relationship among partners was
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doctrine of corporate opportunity,' 1 2 there is surely a doctrine of
partnership opportunity.113 The articles of partnership should
spell out in some detail what opportunities are denied the general
partner, including therein a prefatory statement clearly indicating
that the list is intended to be illustrative rather than exclusive.
Conflicts of Interest
At times, limited partnerships having common general part-
ners may deal with one another. As a result, questions arise as to
whether an improper conflict of interest is involved. Transac-
tions of this type ought to be avoided unless the articles and
recorded certificate of limited partnership specifically authorize
such dealings. Where such authority does exist, however, partner-
ship law would seem to present no obstacle. 1 4 Nonetheless, it
would do no harm to expand the boilerplate to include language
indicating that partnerships with common general partners are to
be deemed distinct and separate legal entities and that the activities
of the general partner in participating in the management of
another partnership (or corporation) which has business dealings
with the subject partnership will not constitute an improper conflict
of interest.
A number of such conflict of interest problems typically ap-
pear in real estate syndications. For example, a problem may be
encountered if the general partner is an affiliate or general partner
of another limited partnership dealing in similar investments. Prob-
lems also exist where an affiliate of the general partner renders
discussed in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928), wherein Chief Judge
Cardozo noted:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to some-
thing stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
Id. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546.
112 The corporate opportunity doctrine is based on the theory that a corporate director
owes a paramount duty to his corporation. Thus, if a business opportunity is within the
scope of the corporation's own activities and of advantage to it, the corporate director may
not seize the opportunity for himself. See Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323 Mass. 187,
80 N.E.2d 522 (1948) (corporate director violated his fiduciary obligations and could not
retain the profits made by him at the expense of the corporation).
113 For a discussion of the accountability of a partner as a fiduciary, see CRANE &
BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 389-97.
1 14 Ballantine, Adoption of Uniform Partnership Act in California, 17 CALIF. L. REV. 623,
626, 628 (1929). Under the common law aggregate theory of partnerships, Y, being a
partner of both the XY and YZ partnerships, could conceivably be a party plaintiff and a
party defendant to the same action. Id. at 628. Under the UPA and the entity theory,
however, such partnerships are treated as distinct entities - as though they were composed
of strangers- and the common party problem thereby ceases to exist. Id. at 626, 628.
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services to the partnership as, for example, an underwriter, broker,
or manager.'
15
The articles of partnership could probably exculpate the gen-
eral partner from all violations except a wilful breach of his
trust. 1 6 Such a provision being undoubtedly valid, 1 7 it is incum-
115 The Securities and Exchange Commission found the following possible sources of
conflict to be present in the majority of real estate limited partnerships or real estate
investment trust (REIT) offerings:
1. The general partner is a general partner or an affiliate of the general partner in
other limited partnerships (public and/or private) dealing in similar investments.
2. The general partner has the power (and does) invest the partnership's funds in
other limited partnerships in which the general partner or an affiliate is the general
partner.
3. Properties are bought from or sold to affiliates.
4. Affiliates who act as underwriters, real estate brokers, managers, etc., for the
partnership act in such capacities for affiliated partnerships (or other affiliated
entities).
5. The same counsel represents both the partnership and the general partner.
6. In a REIT, the advisor hired, or the trustees, are engaged in other real estate
activities.
7. The general partner or an affiliate is hired by the partnership to manage the
properties purchased, receiving sizable compensation.
8. An affiliate of the general partner acts as the unlerwriter for the offering,
receiving underwriting compensation.
9. An affiliate of the general partner is a real estate broker, receiving finders fees
for purchases of property for the partnership*
10. An affiliate ofYthe general partner is a real estate broker, receiving commissions
for sales of the partnership's property.
11. The law firm with which the general partner is-affiliated renders opinions and
drafts partnership documents and receives legal fees.
12. An affiliate of the general partner acts as an insurance agent for properties
acquired by the partnership, receiving commissions.
13. An affiliate of the general partner acts as the accountant and administrator for
the partnership, receiving payment from the partnership for such services.
14. An affiliate of the general partner places mortgages for the partnership or
otherwise acts as a finance broker, receiving commissions for such services.
15. An affiliate of the general partner acts as a leasing agent receiving fees. (In the
case of low and moderate government assisted housing some fees are far in excess
of those permitted by the government if additional funds of limited partners had
not been involved.)
REAL ESTATE ADVISORY COMM., REPORT TO THE SEcuRrrIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
42-44 (Oct. 12, 1972). The Report noted that "[tihe conflicts of interest problem can be a
substantial one, in part because of the limited partners' lack of power, and in part because of
the many opportunities for overreaching." Id. at 44.
116 Cf. 2 A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 170.9 (3d ed. 1967). For an example of such a wilful breach
of trust, see Executive Hotel Associates v. Elm Hotel Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 354, 245 N.Y.S.2d
929 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1964), wherein the court observed:
The conflict of interest between [the general partner's] duties to his partners and
his self-interest in Elm resolved itself in a series of maneuvers, artful in design,
brazen in their execution and utterly callous to the fiduciary obligations owed tohis
limited partners.
Id. at 357, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
117See, e.g., Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky, 25 App. Div. 2d 291, 295, 268
N.Y.S.2d 854, 858 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386
(1966), wherein the court noted that where there is no legal prohibition to the contrary,
agreement regarding partnership affairs may be made according to the wishes of the
partners. See also Comment, Public Limited Partnerships in Northwest Real Estate Syndication, 7
WILUAMErE L.J. 74, 79-82 (1971).
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bent upon the prospective investor to protect himself by carefully
analyzing the articles of partnership and evaluating both the exist-
ing exculpatory clauses and the character and standing of the
principals involved.
Warranties of the General Partner
The articles of partnership normally include a multitude of
warranties by the general partner to the limited partners. They
relate to such items as title to land, the existence of title insurance,
financing, initial operating losses, zoning, availability of utilities,
mechanic's lien protection, due organization of the partnership,
construction contracts, and plans and specifications.
Assignability of Limited Partnership Interests
Just as a corporate stockholder needs the right to sell and
assign his stock, the limited partner needs the right to assign his
interest. The certificate, together with the articles of partnership,
will deal extensively with restrictions on such assignments.1 18 Cus-
tomary provisions call upon counsel for the partnership to examine
the proposed assignment to see that it does not offend either the
Internal Revenue Code or federal and state securities laws. And,
transfer to a minor, who is unable to act in those situations where
consent of the limited partners is necessary, is forbidden. A right of
first refusal may be retained in the other limited partners. In
addition, provision is made for terminating the limited partnership
status of the assignor and for admitting the assignee as a substitute
limited partner. Generally, the articles vest the exclusive right to
admit an assignee in the general partner. After the general partner
gives his written consent to the substitution, copies of the assign-
ment and consent, as required by the articles, will be lodged with
the partnership.
The Mortgage Documents
For income tax purposes it is necessary to structure the
mortgages so that no partner is personally liable. 119 Therefore,
the mortgage documents, viz, the commitment, mortgage, and
mortgage note, should contain provisions immunizing all partners
from personal liability, a mortgage being perfectly valid without
""See CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 149.
"'See Heyman & ParnaU, supra note 1, at 260.
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such.120 Alternatively, the deed may run to a nominee who exe-
cutes the mortgage and conveys the mortgaged land to the
partnership. The use of a nominee is uniformly recognized as an
approved practice limiting the liability of principals in a real estate
transaction. 2'
Admission of Investors into the Partnership
To get the partnership started, it is not uncommon to find only
two partners: the promoter general partner and a nominal limited
partner who makes a nominal capital contribution of $100. As the
investors are signed up, they are admitted as limited partners
pursuant to detailed provisions of the articles of partnership.
These terms provide for the return to the nominal limited partner
of his capital contribution and for his retirement from the partner-
ship. This procedure eliminates the strawman used to create the
entity, and thereafter only serious investors remain.
Treatment of Defaulting Limited Partners
At times the investors make a downpayment on the purchase
of their interests, contracting to pay the balance of the purchase
price at a stated time or times. Obviously defaults will sometimes
occur. Coercive provisions are common. For example, there may be
a provision giving any nondefaulting limited partner the right to
purchase the defaulting limited partner's interest by payment of an
amount equal to 10 percent of the defaulting limited partner's
prior capital contribution. If valid, such a provision has an obvious
in terrorem effect, but some courts are likely to view such provi-
sions as invalid forfeitures. 122 They may also run afoul of the
price-unconscionability rule. 23
"'See R. KRATOVIL, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 104 (1972); G. OSBORNE,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES §§ 102-05 (2d ed. 1970).121 See Barkhausen v. Continental Ill. Nati Bank & Trust Co., 3 II. 2d 254, 120 N.E.2d
649, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 897 (1954) (beneficiaries of a trust created in a mortgagor's interest
in mortgaged property were not liable for the mortgage indebtedness). See also Cook, Straw
Men in Real Estate Transactions, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 232 (1940); Schwartz, Using Corporate
Nominees in Real Estate Transactions, 2 REAL ESTATE Rav. 91 (Fall 1972). The tax aspects of
such transactions are discussed in Kurtz & Kopp, Taxability of Straw Corporations in Real Estate
Transactions, 22 TAx LAw. 647 (1969).
112 See, e.g., Freedman v. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Mathias Parish, 37 Cal. 2d
16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951) (in an action based on a contract for the sale of property, breaching
party held entitled to recover the amount of his downpayment in excess of defendant's
damages).
121 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 234, comment c at 109 (Tent. Draft No. 5
1970).
1975]
74 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
The ULPA, adopted in times when ventures were small and
limited partners few, is poorly adapted to large transactions. For-
tunately, the Uniform Commissioners have embarked upon a proj-
ect to revise its provisions. It is hoped that such a revision will
answer some of the problems raised in this Article.
